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*

Yale Univer sity

Discus sions regardi ng the stakes of less develop ed countr ies (U>Cs) in
interna tional moneta ry reform have typica lly emphas ized the benefi ts to
LDCs
of an interna tional moneta ry system conduc ive to fast growth and freer
trade
and financ ial policie s in the indust rialize d countr ies.

Much has also been

written regardi ng schemes to link expans ions in world liquid ity• either
by
issuing specia l drawing rights (SDRs) or by a once-a nd-for- a-while increas
e
in the price o:f' moneta ry gold, to an increas ed flow of financ ial resourc
es
to LDCs1 •

Some

attenti on will be given in this paper to these issues , but

more will be said on two relativ ely neglec ted areas:

the positio n of LDCs

in a world of greate r exchang e rate flexib ility, and the interac tions
of LDCs
with the emergin g interna tional capita l market s ..
The 1972-74 commodity boom, includi ng the remark able increas es in oil
prices , on the one hand, and the plight of some African nations in the
Sahel and of Bangla desh, on the other, have dramat ically undersc ored
during
recent years the old cliche about LDC heterog eneity.

In this pa.per two

charac teristic s will receive specia l attenti on for the purpos e of differe
n..
tiating among LDCs: endowment of natura l resourc es with high direct or
indirec t
world demand , and degree of openne ss to interna tional trade and finance
.
Inevita bly• Saudi Arabia will seek from the interna tional. financ ial system

services different in quality and. quantity from those sought by Chad, while
Brazilian attitudes toward greater excha.na.ge flexibility can be expected to
differ from those of Upper Volta..

LDCs and Exchange Rate Flexibility
The LDCs • speaking with notable unanimity via. the "Group of 24.'' have
indicated a preference for fixed exchange rates for the currencies of indus
trialized countries, while reserving their option to adopt for themselves
more flexible exchange rate arrangements.

Such LDC preference for fixed

rates ( a.t lea.st for the industrialized nations) has ca.used some bewilderment
and criticism. even among observers most sympathetic to LDC positions 2 •

Yet•

as in the case of the general debate of fixed versus flexible rates• although
with substantive differences in the arguments, something economically sensi
ble can be said on both sides of the debate as to whether LDCs can be expected
to benefit or suffer from the adoption by industrialized countries of more
flexible exchange rates.

While I end up preferring the greater flexibility

w-ich reality has imposed on the world, it seems necessary to first review
the arguments on the other side, which the profession has tended to ignore•
very much as new converts fear showing any sign of sympathy for pa.st aban
doned beliefs.
Much of what follows relies on concepts developed in discussions regare.
ing "optimum currency areas" 3• In those discussions a. small, open econoley' is
viewed a.s one with a. high share of trada.ble goods in its Gross National
Product• with prices in foreign currency of those tra.da.ble goods being given
exogenously to the small country.

Note that this definition can apply to
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Holland or Portugal as well as Honduras ; our concern here is with the latter
type of country.

Another key concept is that of a disturbance , which m~ be

caused by policy or by nature, and which may originate inside or outside the
country.

These useful concepts, alas• are not easily quantifiabl e.

The

borderlines between tradable and non-tradabl e goods and between small and
large countries are misty• and even the definition of a disturbance is not
unambiguous .

The analysis of exchange rate policy, including ours, is

plagued by such difficultie s ruling out a precise differentia tion between
small, open econanies and others.

But many LDCs can be characteriz ed as

small 11 open economies with a minimum of ambiguity.

It m~ be useful to

first consider why this type of LDC mq prefer not only to fix its own
exchange rate• but also to see all major exchange rates fixed in relation
to one another.
Even the most ardent advocates of greater exchange rate flexibility
have recognized that small, open economies would do well to fix their
exchange rates in tenns of a dominant currency.

The basic argument is well

presented by Harry G. Johnson• albeit with some departures from his usually
high standards for scientific language:
"One is accustomed to thinking of national monies in terms
of the currencies of the major countries• which currencies
derive their usefulness from the great diversity of goods,
services• and assets available in the national econo?ey" • into
which they can be directly converted. But in the contemporar y
world there are many small and relatively narrowly specialized
countries• whose national currencies lack usefulness in this
sense• but instead derive their usefulness from then rigid
convertibil ity at a fixed price into the currency of some
major country with which the small country trades extensively
or on which it depends for capital for investment. For such
countries• the advantage of rigid convertibil ity in giving the
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currency use:fulness and facilitating internation al trade and
investment outweigh the relatively small advantages that might
be derived from exchange rate flexibility . (In a. banana re
public, for example, the currency will be more useful if it
is stable in terms of command over foreign gooes than if it is
stable in terms of command over bananas; and exchange-ra te
flexibility would give little scope for autonomous domestic
policy.) 114
·
The sma.11 1 open econoJI\Y' will wish to peg to the currency of the
country with_ which it has most of its trade and financial relations.
Thus, Guatemala will peg to the dollar and Chad to the French Franc.

If

the internation al trade and financial flows are exclusively with the country
to whose currency the peg is dete:nnined, fluctuation s between that key
currency end other key world currencies vill matter little to the small
country.

Its domestic price level will be unaffected by those fluctuation s,

while prudent managers of the external assets and liabilities of the small
countr.r will have little doubt as to the choice of foreign currency denomi
nation for their financial instruments .

Reserves held in hegemonic curren

cies will assure the citizens of the small country holding the national
currency that domestic disturbance s I such as the failure of an exportable
crop, need not destroy the "internatio nal moneyness" of their currency
holding, and will allow the small country to draw on the real resources of
the hegem.onic power during the crisis.

The balance of peyments of the

small country will be influenced by fluctuation s among key currencies only
in a very indirect fashion I of quantitativ ely negligible proportions .
Max Cord.en has de_finea.5 a "pseudo-exc hange-rate union" as one in which

members agree to maintain fixed exchange-ra te relationshi ps within the union,
but without explicit integration of economic policy, and with neither a
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common pool of foreign-ex change reserves nor a single central bank•

Thus,

Guatemala could be said to have a unilatera l commitmen t to a pseudo-ex change
rate union with the United States, while Puerto Rico has a full exchangerate or monetary union.

In the extreme case when the small country has all

its trade and financial transacti ons with the hegemonic country, the practical
invarianc e of its price level to fluctuatio ns among key currencie s establish
a "pseudo-op timum currency area," needing only greater factor mobility,
particula rly of unskilled labor, to approach the complete requireme nts of an
optimal currency area, from the viewpoint of the small country.

On this

respect, one could also contrast the cases of Guatemala and Puerto Rico.
An extreme type of small, open econom;y' practical ly eliminate s the

pos-s-ibil ity of policy-in duced danestic monetary disturban ces by doing aw~
with its own Central Bank, relying on the currency and monetary system of the
hegemonic power to which it is attached, as in the case for many years of the
Republic of Panama.

Natural disturban ces originati ng domestic ally, or dis

turbances ot any kind originati ng a.broad trigger adjustmen t mechanism s
similar to those discribed by text books for the gold standard, or by J.C.
Ingram for the Puerto Rican case6 • Such an adjustmen t process requires for
the smooth achieveme nt of both peyments equilibriu m and reasonabl y full
employmen t either flexibili ty in domestic money wages or freedom of factor
movements between the small country and the hegemonic power.

As such small

countries are likely to carry a very large share of their foreign trade and
financial transactio ns with one large country, the relevant foreign distur
bances will be those originati ng within that power, much as West Virginia is
affect,ed by what happens in the rest of the United States, and cares
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relatively little about disturbances originating in France.

It is noteworthy

that Milton Friedman has suggested that policies discussed above for an
extreme type of small• open LDC ( fixed exchange rates , no monetary autonomy)
cam be applied to most developing countries• whose alleged monetary concupis
cence ppesumably canno.t

be restrained by any other means 7 •

So far the discussion has focused on the exchange rate between the small
and the large country to which it is associated.

If in fact all international

trade and financial flows of the small country are with one large country, the
exchange rate between that large country and the rest of the world will be
largely a matter of indifference for our small country.

But once some trade

and financial flows are allowed between our small country and others (besides
the large hegemonic power), matters change.

Consider a world made up of two

large and one sma.11 country• whose exchange rate is pegged to one of the
large countries.

If a disturbance arising in one or another of the large

countries • and affecting only their mutual trade, is handled by successful
fiscal and monetary measures as well as by reserve changes, leaving their
exchange rates unchanged, the impact of such disturbance on the sma.11 country
will be negligible.

If• however. the disturbance is allowed to modify the

exchange rate between the large countries• the impact on the effective
exchange rate of the sma.11 country• its tenns of trade• and on the real value
8
of its foreign debt and exchange reserves will be felt at once •
The disturbance hypothesized in the previous paragraph is rather special.
Consider now a more general type of disturbance• sey- a sudden expansion of
military expenditures not covered by taxes in the large country to whose
currency the small country is pegged.

If the large countries are also· pegged

-7to each other, the excessive monetary expenditu res will spill out toward
the small and the second large country, according to the relevant
ginal propensit ies in the inflating large country.

mar-

The small country, whether

it follows a passive monetary policy or actively wishes to keep in step with
tb,e hegemonic power, will also inflate approxim ately in proportio n to the
hegemonic power.

If the other large country checks the imported inflation ary

pressures , it will maintain a tendency toward surplus in its b,alance of
p~ments, including vis-'-vis our small country

which will tend to switch

the source of 1-ts imports aw~ from the hegemonic power, even as it tries to
sell to it more of its exports.
a breakdown

So long as this situation does not lead to

of relativel y free trade and convertib ility in the system, the

adjustmen t burden for the small country will be relativel y minor (and almost
pleasant) .

Clearly, however, the situation described above will not have

reached a new equilibriu m until the second industria l country either inflates
in proportio n to the hegemonic power or revalues its currency.
Suppose now that the disturban ce originate s in the second large country,
and that again it 9.lso involves a sudden inflation ary expansion of its public
expenditu re.

So long as the exchange rate between ,the two large countries

remains pegged and wol?ld trade and financial rules are unchanged , the impact
of this disturban ce on our small country will remain even more indirect and
minor than in the previous example, given the assumptio ns regarding trade
and financial links.
If the disturban ce in either of the two large countries is in a defia
tionary direction I the small country will still be least affected if such
disturban ce ii handled by compensat ory fiscal and monetary policies in the
large countries • withou.t resorting to exchange rate changes between them.

When the disturbance originating abroad involves just one internation al
market which mey- be of particular importance to the small country (e.g.,
that for its major export, such as the banana market, or for its major import,
such as the oil market l, the small country will typically prefer to handle
such disturbance s. by taxes or subsidies specific to the commodity with erratic
fluctuation s, rather than by changing its exchange rate, a measure which
would a:ffect all danestic prices for import ables and export ables.
Do most LDCs conduct all or nearly all of their trade and financial transactions with one major industrializ ed country-?

A little noticed benefit for

many LDCs of the 1944-1971 world economic order, including relatively fi.xed
rates among key currencies and their eventual convertibi lity, has been
precisely the creation of a multilatera l framework within which trade and
financial diversifica tion could occur, in contrast with the pre-1944 order
characteriz ed by inward-look ing trading and financial blocs led by colonial
and/or hegemonic industrializ ed powers.

Of total Latin American exports,

for example, 46 percent went to the United States in 1950.
one third of those exports went to the United States.

By 1972, only

In 1960 almost half

of all exports of Afriaen LDCs went to the United Kingdom, France end
Belgium.

By 1972 that share had declined to 31 percent.

Similar trends

have taken place on the import side; one should note, however, that conver
tibility has allowed substantial and persistent imbalances in the bilateral
trade and payments of many LDCs vis-a'.-vis large industrial countries 9 •
Not all LDC regions have experienced the diversifica tion noted for
Latin America and Africa, and it could be argued that gains in trade diver
sification with respect to the industrializ ed countries of Western Europe
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are partly illusory, as that area has become more of a single· decision
making unit.

Intra-LDC trade, and that between LDCs and socialist countries,

have remained relatively modest.

But the generalization that for all prac

tical purposes most LDCs have an optimun currency·area including just a given
LDC plus its hegemonic trading partner is untenable.

Diversification has

advanced too far in most LDCs for such a narrow view of their currency
arrangements•

Once actual and expected (or desired) trade and financial

diversification is introduced, dicisions on exchange rate policy and fi
nancial management for LDCs, particularly the smaller ones, become more
difficult.

Those difficulties mey be illustrated as follows

Consider a hypothetical example of an LDC, whose exports (or imports)
amount to 30 percent of its Gross National Product. Sey half of its
exports go to France and half to the United States, while 40 percent of
its imports come from France and 60 percent from the United States.

Its

capital account transactions could be one third with France, one third with
the United States and one third with Japan. Question one:

would this LDC

rationally prefer fixed or floating rates among the dollar, the franc and
the yen?

Question two: is this hypothetical example, with its trade and

financial di versification, more likely to be a. realistic one 1.mder fixed or
floating rates among the dollar, the franc and yen?
For the small country having or aspiring to have the indicated interna
tional di versification, a world in which Balance of Peyments adjustment
among France, the United States and Japan occured somehow without changes
in their exchange rates, and without limiting their freedom of trade and
financial transactions, would be clearly preferable to one with floating

rates among the three key currencies.

The difficult decisions presented by

that last scenario are several.
A first obvious decision has to do with the peg; should it be with res
pect to the dollar, the franc, the yen, or to some kind of a weighted average
of the three (or to SDRs)?

In the simplest, extreme case discussed earlier,

pegging to the hegemonic key currency tied the small country price level to
that of the major country, while remaining invariant to changes among key
currency values, and price levels in the rest of the world.

Now no pegging

to any single currency will achieve the objective of isolating the domestic
price level from nuctuations among key currencies.

Put another we;y, under

conditions of diversification, pegging to a single key currency will result
in variations in the effective exchange rate of the small country.

Those

variations will result fran fluctuations among key currencies, and will have
nothing to do with the Balance of Peyments position of the small co1mtry.
The variations among key currencies mey result from fundamental disturbances,
such as those discussed above, or from the erratic performance of exchange
markets.

Post-1971 experience has served to allay the worst fears of those

opposing exchange rate t'lexibility, but it also casts doubts on the hope that
stabilizing speculation would keep exchange rate movements small and gradual;
and responsive only to fundamental disturbances10 •
To reduce its loss of control over its effective exchange rate, the

small country will have to peg to a weighted average of key currencies.

If

the goal is to keep domestic prices in line with the "world" price level, the
weights will have to correspond to those of each major country_ in such price
level..

If the explicit goal is to maintain balance of pqments equilibrium
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by manipulating the effective exchange rate, more complicated calculations,
involving price elasticities by regions, will be required.

In practice,

crude (and changing) weighting rules are likely to be followed, as the ideal
weighting system is difficulty to define even in theory.

For example, how

should financial flows with different countries be weighted, as compared to
trade flows?

In short, the simplicity and neatness of pegging to a single

key currency will be inevitably lost.
The ~othetical example of a small, diversified LDC given above
included a trade surplus with France, matched by a trade deficit with the
United States.

Historically, this kind of triangularity gave countries such

as Canada. and Argentina numerous headaches at times of stress in the interna
tional economy, as during the 1930s.

Many LDCs are in similar positions todey.

Current account surpluses, for example, are earned by many Caribbean islands
in their dealings with the United States, while they register dificits with
Western Europe.

Allowing fluctuations among key currencies will introduce

one more source of l.mcertainty about the tenns of trade, servicing the foreign
debt and the Balance of Payments of small countries previously benefitting
from convertibility at fixed exchange rates.
Even if it is assumed that fluctuations are arol.md a known long rtm
average dollar-franc rate ( using our hypothetical example) and that at that
rate the franc surplus and the dollar deficit match, the franc-dollar rate
fluctuations will in all likelihood lead to higher reserve holding by the small
country, as the balance of peyments position of that LDC, defined in either
currency (or in domestic currency) for a given month or year, will be subject
to one more element of uncertainty.

The increased reserve holdings, of course,
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carry a significant cost.
When our small country carried all of its trade and financial transactions
with one hegemonic power, with which it kept a pennanently fixed exchange rate,
the decision regarding in which currency external assets and liabilities (public
or private) should be held was straightforward.

If somehow the small country

could be assured of permanently fixed rates, with convertibility among key cur
rencies, that decision would remain easy.
folio manage~ent becomes more difficult.

But with floating key currencies, port
Crude rules of thumb similar to those

guiding the multi-currency pegging can be devised.

For example, the holding

by the Central Bank of different foreign currencies can be made a f,mction of
(beaides interest rates) possible deficits with the different key currency
zones, and the expected fluctuations among key currencies.

Foreign public

liabilities in a given key currency could be made a function of expected pey
ments surpluses with that currency area, again adjusted by expected fluctuations am:mg key currencies and interest rates.

Such general rules, however,

are easier to enunciate in general than to make specific in practice,
particularly when substantial capital flows are involved in the payments and
surpluses with different currency areas.

Furthermore, the search by monetary

authorities for avoidance of exchange risks will not be a costless operation•
although such costs could be partially offset by learning effects and gains
in self-confidence.
Attempts to minimize risks in a world of floating key currencies could
lead to other costs for LDCs, going well beyond those involved in expanding
and upgrading Central Bank (and private sector) staffs of financial analysts.
If the small, open LDC pegs its currency to just one of the key currencies,
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trade and fina.nciaJ. transactions could be diverted toward the area using such
hegemonic currency, even when reaJ. costs would suggest a more diversified
pattern.

The anti-trade bias of greater exchange flexibility perceived by

some anaJ.ysts becomes a trade-diverting bias for the small LDC pegged to one
key currency.

Similar considerations would apply, perhaps with greater force,

to its internationaJ. transactions on capital account;

the small country ma...v

perceive that its exchange risks will be reduced by denominating its foreign
debt in the intervention currency.

To avoid such departures from effective

multilateralism , the small LDC will have to peg to a bundle of key currencies,
a decision which, as already discussed, presents its own problems.
The political implications of this analysis are fairly clear.

But it is

well to emphasize that it is not just an "irrational" dislike of the neocolonial
flavor of pegging to just one key currency in a world of generalized floating
which leads several LDCs to prefer fixed exchange rates across the board.

The

likely retreat from effective multilateralism , and a reversaJ. of trends toward
trade and financial diversification involved in pegging to just one key currency
would involve real economic costs, and so would pegging to a bundle of them.
As already noted, in spite of the arguments presented in the previous
pages, I end up believing that generalized floating among key currencies,
although presenting LDCs with new problems, is a better system from their
viewpoint than any feasible aJ.temative.

When discussing disturbances origin

ating within large industriaJ.ized countries, it was pointed out above that
those countries could generally avoid exchange rate changes by wise fiscal and
monetary management offsetting disturbances.

But

it is precisely departures

from such wisdom which have created most disturbances in the first place, so
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that hopes for offsetting wisdom seem utopian.

While the relatively fixed

rates for key currencies during 1944-1971 were compatible on the whole with
trade and financial liberalization in the industrialized countries, the late
1960s gave clear indications that with the degree of interdependence achieved
and with a realistic assesment of the macroeconomic policy performance of the
rich countries, fixed rates required for their survival growing trade and
financial controls, which stimulated protectionist sentiments.

Given the post-

1966 failure of hegemonic powers to carry out sensible macroeconomic policies
and given the degree of trade and financial interdependence achieved, asking
industrialized countries to maintain fixed exchange rates

~

liberal trade

-

and financial regimes and expansionary policies is asking for the moon, and
supposes a degree of COJ11petence among rich-country policy-makers (and/or social
cohesion in those societies) which

simply_i ■

not there.

The misuse by the

u.s.

of the "exhorbitant privilege" of the dollar, in particular, doomed the Bretton
Woods system.
There are also some positive aspects of generalized key currency floating
for LDCs.

Some large and not-so-large LDCs, such as Brazil and Colombia, have

alreaey- experimented successfully with crawling or trotting pegs.

While in

those countries exchange rate policy has been used primarily to offset domestic
inflati-onary trends, yielding only modest fluctuations in the real effective
exchange rates, their example coupled with that of key currencies m~ induce
other LDCs to rely more on exchange rate policy and less on quantitative
restrictions for balancing their international accounts, with likely gains in
efficiency and growth.
Besides LDCs with secular inflationary problems, or inefficient trade
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and p~ents policies, and those in peculiar entrep8t circumstances, such as
Lebanon and Singapore,

it will be the LDCs with the larger and more di versi

fied domestic markets which will find it easier to experiment with greater
exchange rate flexibility.

Those countries will be able to follow a more

-. independent monetary policy, complementing their political. independence.

The

dilemmas imposed on the small, open LDCs by generalized floating is in fact
just on,e more manifestation of the "small country problem" in a contemporary
international scene, where political power accumulates in large countries,
or coalitions of them, and is used to further economic goals.

The small

country also occupies a paradoxical position in the theory of tx·a.de and
finance:

it is supposed to face a perfectly elastic demand for its exports

(so it need not worry about meeting the Marshall-Lerner condition) yet it ■
smallness presumably deprives it of policy tools available to larger countries.
When trade theorists discuss interactions between tariffs, subsidies and the
exchange rate

(or multiple exchange rates), showing how alternative mixes

of those policy instruments can yield equivalent relative price structures,
little or no attention is given to how different decisions on exchange rate
policy influence the capital account of the balance of payments nor the
moneyness II of domestic currency.

II

All of this, of course, is one l'!X)re

example of the lack of integration between the real and financial elements of
international trade theory.

On balance, the emphasis of trade theorists may

be correct and it may well be that the monetary impotence of small open LDCs
has been exaggerated by focusing on the limits set by the tradable/non-tra
dable goods dichotomy discussed earlier.
Although by definition small open economies have a high share of imports
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and exports in GNP, it is not obvious that their share of importables and
export ables in GNP will also be higher than in larger economies.

To start

with, the share of services in GNP does not seem to be very strongly related
to size (whether geographic or economic) nor to per capita income.

In some

economies tourism or temporary emigration m~ transform some services into
"exportables", but that effect does not appear to be systematically related
to size.

Local tastes or the relative size of the subsistence sector can

also influence the degree of substitutability between locally produced and
consumed agricultural and manufactured goods, and similar ones traded
internationally.
A ve:y out of these ambiguities ma.y be sketched as follows.

The univer

salization of markets for clearly tradable · ·goods has been accompanied by a
similar universalization of capital markets;

it would be difficult to settle

whether in recent years the mobility of tradable goods has been greater or
less than that for financial capital.

Thus, it is not only the prices of

tradables but also the rate of return to capital which have tended

to equal

ity within the Atlantic/and Pacific trading communities and those LDCs
attached to it.

Unskilled labor remains the factor (after "land") least

mobile internationally, as the postwar has also witnessed growing universali zation in the market for skilled labor.

Under these circumstances, a change

in the exchange rate by a given country may be viewed as an attempt to change
the wages of its domestic unskilled labor expressed in truly tradable goods.
The key policy variable becomes, ceteris paribus, the ratio of unskilled
wage rates expressed in domestic money to the exchange rate.

As a single

unemployed or partly employed individual attempts to improve his lot by cutting
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down the wage at which he will supply his labor. a colllltry with payments prob

lems is faced with the need to shade the real rewards in terms of tradable
goods of its major immobile factor of production.

Such a change, of course•

can be accomplished either by changes in the ,exchange rate or in money wage
rates.

Either change can be said to be caused by the international immobility

of unskilled labor in the face of payments imbalances.

As a result• larger net

exports of goods and services as well as larger net inflows of capital can be ex
pected. It could also be assumed 9 not implausably, that non-traded goods use un
skilled labor more intensively than traded goods• which rely more on skilled
labor• capital and rare natural resources.
Modem devaluation theory emphasizes that an exchange rate change, starting from an equilibrium situation• will not change any relative prices or any
other real variable over the long run.

Devaluation is then best viewed as a

way of getting around some market imperfection• such as wages and prices which
are sticky downward, which block a speedy and smooth return to equilibrium
after some disturbance has shocked the system.

When viewed from tl:lis angle it

becomes less obvious why a small open LDC cannot use exchange rate changes,
just as larger countries do, to achieve desired reductions in real wages or in
real money supplies.

"Money illusion" among wage earners in the modern sector

of small countries is less likely a priori, but their social cohesion (or
"discipline") mey be higher.
It may be noted that in some LDCs convertibility at a rate finnly pegged
to a hegemonic currency is not.only a policy designed by conservative Central
Bankers to assure holders of domestic currency of its "moneyness", but also
(or primarily) a policy aimed to assure elites that, if political trouble
threatens domestically, they can speedily transfer their locally-held

wealth to New York, Paris or London.
assets besides domestic money.

Such weal th, of course, will include many

Large reserves and a pegged rate under those

circumstances mey be convenient insurance for the elites, but not necessarily
desirable policies from the viewpoint of, sey, unemployed unskilled workers.
While in some countries the elites may derive most of their earnings from
exports, making them willing to contemplate frequent devaluations, in other
COWltries elite expenditure patterns mey be so oriented toward truly tradable
goods and services (e.g., tourism abroad) as to induce them to support firmly
pegged and convertible exchange rates.
During the 1950s and early 1960s even small countries with fixed parities
maintained a modest degree of autonomy over monetary policy, thanks to imper
fections in international capital mobility.

As such mobility improved dram

atically during the late 1960s and early 1970s,

small countries (and not

so-small ones, like Mexico) were faced with new choices, familiar to small
industrialized economies:

letting their remaining 100netary autonorcy evaporate,

imposing or tightening exchange controls• or abandoning fixed rates.
It remains true that the socially optimal degree of exchange rate flex
ibility in a small open LDC is likely to be, ceteris paribus, somewhat smaller ·
than in large industrialized countries.

Very frequent devaluations of the

effective exchange rate or low levels of international reserves will raise
doubts among holders of domestic currency as to the "moneyness" of such asset.
Ultimately• however, one returns to key assumptions regarding Central Bank
behavior in different countries.

A small open economy following a prudent

monetary policy and producing a staple with good export prospe.cts (oil instead
of bananas), and surrounded by large industrialized countries tmdergoing

rampant inflation coupled with generalized key currency floating could certs.in
ly. revalue its exchange rate fairly frequently without jeopardizing the "money
ness" of its domestic currency nor upsetting its (non-exporting) wealthy elites.
If one were to explain why Canada. has followed a more flexible exchange rate
policy than Mexico it is unlikely that a plausible answer can be built around
differences in the share of tradables in GNP between those two countries;
different degrees of confidence on monetary and political authorities, allowing
tolerance for flexibility in one case while imposing the discipline of fixed
rates plus convertibility in the other, appears to be a more likely (if un
quantifiable) explanatory variable.
Those arguing that LDCs should, for their own good, lock their ronetary
tools within a species of chastity belt and throw away the key, prefer to assume
a relatively tranquil world environment, offering an anchor of price level
stability.

Such a view was vt.l.id for the late 1950s and early 1960s • but

certainly did not apply during the 1930s and early 1940s • and is quite debat
able for the l970s.

LDCs which followed autonomous monetary policies during

the 1930s, including exchange rate changes, such as Argentina, Brazil and
Colombia, weathered the Great Depression far better than those adhering to
Friedman-Johnson policies of passive adjustment to the actions of hegemonic
powers i i •
To summarize:

the- failure of industrialized countries to discipline

their macroeconomic policies led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system
and it is unlikely that those countries will be able to provide an internation
al framework characterized by relatively free trade, convertibility, steacy

growth~ fixed parities in the foreseeable future.

Such a turn of events
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need not be an unmixed curse for LDCs, however.

Some LDCs ma.y take up the

opportunity to revamp their own trade and payments system, improving its
econanic efficiency.

Others~ move in the direction of greater autonomy in

monetary policy, a step which is consistent with the often-voice d desire of
those countries to eliminate neocolonial dependency inherited from the past.
In many sovereign LDCs, in fact, monetary arrangement s have changed little
since the days of colonial "currency boards", and those monetary arrangement s
are not :fundamental ly different from that of Puerto Rico.
For the sake of maintaining an effectively multilatera l and diversified
framework in their internation al trade and financial links, small LDCs may wish
to peg their currencies to a bundle of key currencies, or to the new SDRs.

In

a world of convertibil ity, pegging to SDRs need not imply using more than one
key currency for market interventio n, nor having more than a small share of
internation al reserves held in such currency.

Over the longer rtm, the new

internation al financial system may give an additional push to integration
efforts• particularl y among the smaller LDCs, by emphasizing the connection
between economic size and effective monetary sovereignty .
Inevitably, LDCs will have to face several burdens in adjusting to a new
internation al environment characteriz ed by floating key currencies.

Such an

environment will impose additional maturation requirement s on LDC ''infant en
trepreneurs ", whether of the public or private sectors, particularl y those
engaged in export drives.

Competition with multination al corporation s, each

having their own specialized group of foreign exchange experts, will not be
made easier in the foreign trade arena, even assuming LDC use of forward ex
change markets located in hegemonic financial centers.

Insofar floating key
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currencies hamper the workings of international capital markets, additional
costs may be incurred by LDCs in tapping that source of finance.
Before turning to the changing relationship between many LDCs and inter
national capital markets, it may be noted that if on balance LDCs rely less on
exchange rate flexibility than the industrialized countries, the case for a.
larger LDC share in world reserves created by international agreement (the SDRs)
is strengthened.

While the float of the currencies of industrialized countries
12
should preswna.bly reduce their demand for reserves (eventua.ily, at least ) , for
reasons given above many LDCs will continue to face limitations on thei,r
exchange rate flexibility due to their smallness, and will keep their currency pegged to one or DX>re key currencies.

So their demand for reserves

(to hold) will be no smaller, and is. likely to be higher, ceteris paribus,
than under the previous system.

LDCs and Evolving World Ca.pital Markets
If the greater mobility of financial capital observed in recent years
accentuates LDC policy dilemnas, it also presents them with new opportunities.
Alrea~ in 1970 Professor Charles P. Kindleberger proposed a greater use by
developing countries of world capital markets, at purely commercial terms,
particularly in view of LDC misgivings about direct foreign investment and
their dissatisfaction with concessional international finance.

13

Since then,

even though LDC borrowing in the national markets of industrialized comtries
in the form of long-term bonds has remained relatively thin, their gross bor
rowing in the Eurocurrency market in the form of medium-tenn bank credits has
boomed.

Up through the first half of 1974, neither generalized floating among
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key currencies nor the stresses placed on the Eurocurrency market by the tur
bulent world econanic scene of 1973/74 had checked the upsurge i.n LDC borrow
ing.

Although data in this area are notoriously imperfect

and incomplete 1

reliable estimates place publicly-announ ced LDC borrowing in Eurorocurrency
markets at $1.4 billion in 1971; $3.6 billion in 1972; $9.1 billion in 1973;
and $6.o billion during the first half of 1974.

Additional borrowing not

recorded in published "tombstones" is said to be substantial. 14

The borrowing

entities include governments, state enterprises and, to a lesser extent,
private businesses.

These amounts are quite spectacular and one is tempted to contrast them
with the stagnant and rachitic figures for concessional finance.
warnings are in order.

But several

The amounts shown are gross magnitudes and little is

known as to the extent Eurocurrency borrowing is replacing more traditional
forms of LDC borrowing, particularly suppliers' credit, nor the exact degree
to which the borrowing is offset by LDC lending in the form of short-term
deposits with Euro-banks, which are said to make up a good part of recent
sharp increases in the international. liquidity of some LDC cent1·al banks.
LDC borrowing in the Eurocurrency market can reduce their borrowing opportu
nities elsewhere, either by making them less creditworthy in the eyes of other
potential lenders of simply by revealing that their need for, s~, tapping the
new oil facility of the IMF is not as pressing as that of other countries.

In

short, neither the degree to which gross LDC borrowing in Eurocurrency markets
has led to decreased borrowing elsewhere, nor the extent to which such borrow
ing has led to a real resource transfer toward those countries are known with
accuracy.
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The figures shown above also hide considerable concentration among bor
rowers.

The eleven largest LDC borrowers in the Eurocurrency market during

1973, each accounti~g for more than $200 Million, represented
the tot.al borrowing.

84 percent of

They were, in descending order of importance:

Me'xico,

;

Algeria, Peru, Brazil, Iran, Greece, Indonesia, Spain, Zal.re, Yugoslavia and
Panamtf.

While this short list shows a heavy concentration of semi-industria l

ized or natural-resourc e-rich countries, it also accounts for a non-trivial
share of third-vorld population.

A similar concentration exists among LDCs

issuing long-term bonds in world capital markets.

In 1972, for example, the

top ten borrowers were, again in descending order of importance:

Israel,

Me'xico, Spain, Brazil, Singapore, Philippines, Hungary, Greece, Pana.ma",
Venezuela, each borrowing at least $40 Million, and accotmting for 90 percent
of all LDC bond issues reported by the World Bank.
Several interrelated issues are raised by the observed trends.

A first

one has to do with the stability and permanence of the Eurocurrency capital
market.

A second one involves the desirability of LDC borrowing in such a

market, either to obtain real resources or greater liquidity.

A third issue

relates to the possibility of generalizing the experience of a few LDCs and
semi-industria lized countries to a larger group.

Finally, one m~ wonder what

the l,lpsurge in world capital market implies for the future of those interna
tional institutions that during most of the post-World War II period replaced
it, from the LDC viewpoint.
Even before the oil price increase of late 1973, and the 1974

"slump

flation" in major industrialized countries, the unregulated Eurocurrency
market had generated much nervousness, as it tended to lend on longer and
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longer terms, even to newcoll'.l:lrs, while continuing to rely on deposits of short
term funds (often '!!:.!:i.. short-term deposits, such as overnight).

While few

doubt that Central Banks of industrialized countries would step in with gen
erous rediscounting facilities in case major Eurocurrency banks got into trou
ble, the uneasiness has persisted, apparently reaching a peak with the "euro
willies" of the European summer of 1974.

It is noteworthy that such nervous

ness originated mainly from worries about the British and Italian economies,
plus the incompetence or venality of some developed-country banks in their
foreign exchange transactions, rather than from fears of LDC defaults.
From the viewpoint of this paper• the principal lesson from the expansion
of the Elurocurrency market is straightforward.

When tmshackled from restric

tive regulations, often inherited_from the special conditions of the 1930s,
private capital markets can mobilize gross sums dwarfing those available from
b_ilateral and multilateral concessional finance, at least for an important
type of LDCs.

Furthennore, such transactions are carried out in a cold stand

offish commercial spirit which contrasts sharply with the tangled, emotional
relations surrounding concessional finance.

Without dramatics countries as

diverse in their domestic policies as Algeria, Bulgaria, Cuba, Peri!, Colombia,
Ivory Coast , the Philippines and South Korea have been making quiet deals with
the money lenders, and obtaining funds which mEey" be spent largely on any country
and -for anything.

It appears self-evident that the LDCs as a group have an

important stake in the continuation of a Eurocurrency market retaining, even
if it becomes somewhat more regulated than it is at present, its characte
ristics of free access, ccmpetitiveness and depolitization.

Indeed, the LDCs

m13¥ benefit from an extension of these characteristics of the Eurocurrency
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market to the national capital markets of industrialized countries• although
it is not clear that any contemporary national capital market can reach the
flexibility and depolitization reached by the Eurocurrency market.

But a

broadening of capital markets available to LDCs could help correct the most
disturbing features of Eurocurrency operations, from the LDC viewpoint.
More on this below.
Those operations remain medium-term banking revolving credits• typically
for a period of 3 to 8 years• with floating interest rates •15

While the com-

mi tment period is as indicated, the loans are renewable at the end of each

six-month period, at which time not only the interest rate• but other condi
tions of the loan, such as the currency which is to be used, can be modified.
In contrast with long-term bonds issued by LDCs at given interest rates, or
borrowing from the World Bank, the LDCs undertake a considerable share of risks
and potential adjustment burdens.

Until the first half of 197~-, the Euromarket

trend was toward a lengthening of maturities and a narrowing by lenders of the
spread between their borrowing and lending rates.

These trends in Eurocredits

seem to have been checked or reversed during 1974, but for
just LDCs.

.!:!:! borrowers,

not

It is also noteworthy that the Eurobond market , little used by LDCs

so far, witnessed a sharp decline in transactions during the first half of 1974.
Influential voices in the development finance field have been raised, war
ning LDCs of the dangers of Eurocurrency transactions.
at length.

It is worth quoting them

The President of the Tuter-American Developnent Bank, Mr. Antonio

Ortiz Mena, stated on April 1974:
" ••• the euro-currency market has provided a large volume of
financing for the region [Latin Ameri'ca] in the last two years,
butoeothis financing is being obtained on conditions that, with-

out careful planning, can frustrate orderly management of the
external debt and even weaken the internal savings efforts of
Olil' countries.
As you know, the usual form of loans in the euro-currency market
is the revolving credit with a fluctuating interest rate. Although
the credit is extended for periods that have been lengthening
gradually to 10 and U years-and 14 and 15 years in some casesin practice the credit is renewed every •ix months, each time at
the interest rate prevailing in the London market (interbank offer
rate, IBOR). Since 1969 there have been sharp ,fluctuations from a
low of slightly over 5 percent to a high of 11 percent.o. It
should be noted that the loans usually are amortized in full at
the end of the agreed period and that the resources are competely
untied.
These operations are transacted with scant knowledge of the
feasibility of the projects, since brokers are camnonly used to
promote lending operations, especially in the developing countrieso
Obviously, such practices can lead to the excessive use of credit
and to an improper allocation of financial resources ••• This
observation is even more to the point if it is kept in mind that
the countries sometimes resort to the euro-currency market to finance
the total cost of an investmento
•••
to those
for more
agencies

in actual figures the euro-currency market supplied resources
countries [eight major Latin .American countries, in 1973]
than double the financing authorized by the international
[the Inter-American and World Banks].

Finally, we note that the oil crisis is forcing the industrialized
countries into the euro-currency market in order to finance their
balance-of-payments deficits, which could displace the developing'
countries,•••
The foregoing considerations suggest the advisability of
broadening tfg Bank's activities so as to increase its advisory
services ••• "
Similar concepts were expressed by Mr. Williams. Gaud, then head of the
International Finance Corporation, on November 7, 1973:
"There are those who have welcomed this growing recourse to
the private capital market by the developing countries as a desir
able trend. It is said to represent a return to the traditional
method of financing economic expansion, leaving the borrowing
country free to make its own decisions on how the ftmds should be
used.
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I recognize that the Euro-currency market has played an impor
tant part in giving the developing countries access to the inter
national capital market to an extent previously impossible since
the end of World War II. I also recognize that it has permitted a
transfer of resources to those countries that would not have been
possible without ito
Nevertheless, I see very real risks for the developing countries
in borrowing so heavily in a market with no established lending
standards and no overall surveillance to prevent unsound practices •••
There is also the fact that the Euro-currency market is, by
its nature, delicately poised and very sensitive both to speculative
monetary investments and to changes in the economic and financial
policies of the capital-exporting countries •••
Another basic uncertainty inherent in Euro-currency funds stems
fran floa.ting interest rates on which those funds are generally
made available to the developing countrieso These constitute too
volatile a base on which to finance long-term industrial and infra
struc~ure projects.
There is another feature of these Euro-currency loans which
should not be overlooked. Foreign private investment is important
to the developing countries not only because it contributes capital
for their development, but because it brings with it technology,
management, training and access to foreign markets--items which
are all in short supply in the Third World. Euro-currency loans
bring with them none of these. Indeed, they are often made even
without any appraisal of the soundness of the projects they are
intended to finance.
Speaking to the U.N. General Assembly the other day Sir Alec
Douglas-Home said: 'the key word for the future of economic
development is partnership.' But there is no partnership between
lenders and borrowers in the Euro-currency market-not only be
cause lenders and borrowers are inevitably remote from each
other, but also because the lenders gave no direct involvement
in the enterprise in which their funds are ultimately invested.
I believe a greater effort needs to be made to supplement
Euro-currency funds for the developing countries with other,
long-term funds. That brings me to private foreign investment •
•••

Europe can play an important role in creating new forms of
mutually beneficial relationships between foreign investors and
the Third Wo~, and we in IFC are eager to support any initiatives
to that end.'

Other, less diplomatic, criticisms of LDC borrowing in the Eurocurrency market are also heard.

In some cases the borrowing is said

to go to purchasing weapons, or to finance current expenditure s.

Cor

ruption is all.eged to exist in many deals• and l.920s-type stories of
\lllhol.y a.l.l.iances between unscrupul.ou s and pushy brokers and venal. LDC
wl.iticans abotmd.
Different grounds for criticizing LDC Eurocurrenc y borrowing should
be kept distinct.

One strand deals with excesses, dangers, and misalloca

tions which may exist in any type of foreign borrowing by sovereign but
imperfect governments , from rich but sometimes greedy bankers or institu
tions (the greed may be for money or power).A~o ther strand refers to rel.ative
benefits and costs of different forms and combination s of foreign borrowing.
The general issue of the development al impact of foreign borrowing has been
discussed ampl.y, here it should be enough to remark that growing indebted
ness, either in absolute amounts or relative to other variables, ma.y be a
sign of troubl.e, or a s'ign of economic health and high expectation s.

Com

pare, for example, a Mexican debt-servic e to exports ratio of 24 percent in
1972, with the l percent correspondi ng to Mali, or the 3 percent of Honduras.
One mey observe, incidentall y, that for many LDCs which borrowed in the Euro
currency market during 1970-73 the real burden of servicing that debt has
been lower than calcul.ated at the time the loans were made, as the magnitude
18
But
of world inflation actually recorded was not expected by most lenders.
inflationar y expectation s, perhaps excessive, are now being built into new
loan agreements, so that such i.mexpected break for LDC debtors is i.mlikely
to be repeated in the case of fresh debt.
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The remarks by the heads of the IADB and the IFC can be• somewhat un
fairly• caricatured in a summary statement:
but only if kept under our tutelage."

"LDC ·foreign borrowing is fine•

Distrust of both LDC ability to manage

sensibly their own financial affairs and of competitive international finan
cial markets is not far from the surface.

These are judgments which cannot

be proven or disproven a priori; clearly, however, they represent a view of
development and self-determination not universally shared.

The point is ~

that one should assume that all LDC borrowing in private international markets
is sound and healthy nor that Eurocurrency bankers are the new heroes of de
velopment, the point is to ask whether in the long run there is any other way
to achieve both international intera.ependence and national self-determination
than to deal through more-or-less competitive• standoffish and remote inter
national markets, fully aware of their risks and dangers.
Access to Eurocredits has expanded the financial options facing many
LDCs, and perhaps little more needs to be said to show the positive impact
of the Eurocurrency market on those countries.

It should be emphasized• how

ever, that different LDCs are likely to use borrowing in that market for dif
ferent purposes.

To some, Eurocredits appear to be mainly a readily available

source of international liquidity, at a cost equivalent to the difference
between interest charges on the loans and the interest they receive on their
Eurocurrency deposits.

In these countries, Eurocredits and the large gross

foreign exchange reserves accompanying them seem designed to increase confi
dence among local and foreign investors.

In other words• in such cases in

flows of portfolio capital are complementary to inflows of other types of
foreign capital, particularly direct foreign investment. That complementarity
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can be quite specific as when an LDC heavily using Eurocredits allows the
local establishment of branches of foreign banks and financial institutions
active in the Eurocurrency market.
other LDCs tap the Eurocurrency market mainly to finance medium- or long
term projects involving real .resource transfers, and which could have been
financed by direct foreign investment or concessional capital flows (or even
domestic savings).

While Algeria and Perd appear to use Eurocredits primarily

for this purpose, Brazil and the Phillipines seem to use such credits mainly
for the former.
Eurocredits, then, can either complement or substitute for other capital
inflows, in a similar fashion that foreign borrowing in general can either
substitute or canplement domestic savings, depending on policy and circum;;;
stances.

A corollary is that links with world capital markets could be used

by LDCs also as complements or substitutes to the expansion of their own

domestic capital markets, depending on their dominant socioeconomic phil
osophy, policies and domestic economic conditions.

It could be that whether

by policy design or as a result of market pressures, links with foreign ca
pital markets tend to hamper rather than promote local long term capital
marketo.

19

In a world characterized by substantial and erratic rates of inflation,
Eurocredits have one little-noticed advantage over traditional loans from
aid agencies.

The loan canmitments from the latter, expressed in nominal

terms, are typically disbursed slowly over a number of years; their real value
will depend on the disbursement speed (much influenced by the lender) and rates
or inflation.

Eurocredit disbursements are faster and more tmder the influence
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of the borrower• who can protect its elf against erosion of the real value
of the loan either by rapid purchases or by placing t.mspent 8.IIX)t.mts to earn
market rates of interest.
As noted earlier, most LDCs have not been directly involved with the
Eurocurrency market nor with other international capital markets.
too small or too poor to be creditworthy to private bankers.

Some are

As in the case

of generalized floating by key currencies• the expansion of world capital
markets mey nudge the smallest LDCs into fonns of integration involving
greater financial cooperation I including joint development banlts which could
act as intermediary with international ca.pital markets.

In other cases• small

and poor countries may choose to search for a.n LDC ''big brother" to guarantee
their borrowing, as in a recent Sudanese loan from the Eurocurrency market
guaranteed by Saudi Arabia.

"Smallness" is likely to prove less of a .

barrier to market access than poverty I particularly poverty in natural resour
ces.

Bolivia and Nicaragua, for example I have been able to tap the Eurocur-

rency market on their o'Wll • but it is unlikely that Bangladesh or India will
be able to do so in massive amounts during the foreseeable future. The soli
darity needed to obtain intra-LDC guarantees or joint borrowing, however• mey
not exist outside the Arab and Latin-American countries.

But even LDCs excluded

from the Eurocurrency market will benefit indirectly from the borrowing by
luckier LDCs in that market, insofar as the latter LDCs absorb less conces s ional finance I freeing it for the neediest cases.
During most of the post-World War II period, international insti tut ions 1
such as the World Bank group and the regional development banks have been pleying
a key financial inte:rmediation role (in addition to multinational corporations

-32-

one mey add).

As the biggest and richest LDCs obtain direct access to

external funds, and other LDCs choose to encourage other financial inter
mediaries over which they feel they have greater control, one may wonder
a°t::)out the pressures on the World Bank group and the Asian and Inter-Ameri can
development banks.

Clearly, the bargaining balance between those institution s

and the more prosperous LDCs have been changed by the proliferatio n of alter
native sources of funds.

Indeed, the rationale justifying Brazilian, ·

Nigerian and Philippine borrowing from the IBRD (excluding IDA credits) at
terms similar to those of Haiti, Ethiopia and Bangladesh is far from self
evident and persuasive.

As LDC heterogenei ty becomes more marked the tradi

tional multilatera l intermediar ies would do well to concentrate their attention on the least developed countries, raising the price at which their services,
including technical hel-p, a.re made available to the more fortunELte LDCs.
The most significant accomplishm ent of the recent expansion of LDC bor
rowing in the Eurocurrenc y market has been_to show that the debacle of the
_1930s did not kill LDC access to world capital markets for all time.

It

is natural to ask why such renaissance did not take place in the national
capital markets of the industrializ ed countries, and whether it can be
extended to them.

It mey seem foolhardy to raise such issues during

1974,

at a time when world financial markets quake under the pressures of recession,
unusual inflation, dramatic increases in oil prices, enormous balance of peyments
deficits in important industrial countries, as well as in several LDCs, and
an internation al monetary order groping its way toward a system.

But the long

run must be given its due, and barring dis aster in the world econoiey', the
dominant trend still points toward complementi ng the trade liberalizat ion

achieved during 1944-1971, with liberalization and thickening of long term
financial flows• in spite (or because?) of floating exchange rates.
Merchandise and service exports from LDCs to industrialized countries,
while still hampered by protectionist obstacles, have expanded markedly
during the 1960s and early 1970s, but their exports of IOU's have been most
ly blocked by fonnal and informal barriers first imposed by many of the
industrialized countries during the 1930s.

A recent study, for example,

concluded that the United States capital securities market has a regulating
apparatus too complex and costly for the purposes of most La.tin American
foreign issues.
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Such regulations, including those of the U.S. Securities

and Exchange Commission and of individual states• have the effect of sub- •
sta.ntially if not entirely closing the United States markets to LDC secur
i ties, whether debt or equity, as effectively as have the more stringent
legal limitations imposed on entry into the national capital markets of the
European countries.

As in the case of certain non-ta.riff barriers to mer

chandise trade, such as health regulations, it is not alweys clear whether
all such regulations do much for the welfare of the consumer or security
buyer in the industrialized country.
The barriers in industrialized countries to the importation of LDC IOU's
.
( and those
of others ) can be summarized as follows: 21

1.

Those related to balance of peyments problems.

Such regulations have

tended to be relaxed by countries trying to avoid revaluation, and tightened
by those warding off devaluation of their currencies.

Some LDCs placing debt

where they could have suffered when revaluations become inevitable, while
losing out from possible gains arising from creditor country devaluations.

2.

Need to obtain permission from national authorities .

This applies

mainly to Europe and Japan, where ex-colonies and particular LDCs obtain
favored treatment.
3.

Information disclosure requirement s I including numerous and cumber

some regulations which increase the cost of public bond flotations

I

which

many observers consider as unnecessary for the protection of purchasers of
securities• or discriminato ry against LDC issuers.

4.

Restriction s on financial institution s.

In many states in the

United States and in virtually all European countries~ banks• insurance com
panies and pension funds are either prohibited from investing in, or are
severely circumscrib ed as to the amount of I LDC and other foreign issues that
can be held in their portfolios.
Not all plans for greater LDC access to capital markets will be equally
desirable.

It has sometimes been proposed, for example, that industrializ ed

countries guarantee LDC public securities issued in their capital markets, at
least regarding political risks.

Other suggestions are the establishme nt in

industrializ ed countries of open-end mutual funds to develop a portfolio of
diversified corporate LDC securities, or of investment companies guaranteed
by industrializ ed countries.

To a greater or smaller degree• these proposals

would-retai n the initiative and control over the financial fl.ow within the
industriali zed countries• with centralized agencies deciding which countries
should receive how much.

The LDCs have long resented having their commodity

exports, even when produced by local entrepreneu rs, transported and sold by
foreign commercial firms• the indicated proposals would again bring a rich
country intermediar y between the exporters of IOU's and their final beyers.
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For a number of LDCs, such guarantees mey even be i.mnecessary to generate
an important flow of portfolio investment, once the most cumbersome and arbit
rary restrictions to entry• discussed above, are removed from the national
capital markets of industrialized countries.

After such restrictions are

lifted, further encouragement of those flows could take the form of generalized
tax exemption for interest earned on LDC securities by industrialized country
bcyers, such as those enjoyed by

u.s.

bcyers of

u.s.

municipal bonds.

It should

be noted that at pres~nt direct investments into LDCs from industrialized coun
tries bene:fit from a number of advantages, such as tax deferral, insurance facil
ities and other public -sector encouragement, discriminating in favor of those
flows over portfolio investments (and in favor of large over small investors,
one ma.v add. )
Even under present circumstances, some LDCs could do more to test the limits
of existing regulations in the capital markets of industrialized countries, as a
prelude to seeking changes in those restrictions.

For example• while in the

United States many states limit purchases of foreign securities by insurance com
panies to a small percentage of the total portfolio of those companies, it ap
pears that in most cases such ceiling has not yet been reached.
is said, has taken advantage of existing margins.

Only Mexico, it

Another example involves the

use of· private placements of long term bonds, instead of public offerings, which
at least in the United States market involves a significant difference in costs,
in favor of the former.
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Even if it means !'helping the competion," multilateral and bilateral. devel
opment financial institutions could supply LDCs a much greater flow of information and technical assistance regarding direct access to world capital markets

than done at present.

For those LDCs unable to go to those markets on their own

or in groups, even if rules of access become liberalized, guarantees by the World
Bank or regional banks of their securities could provide a practical and acceptable
formula, with or without interest rate subsidies.

The application of such guar

antee schemes for particular purposes, such as export financing, also deserve
study and could be justified on "infant market" grounds.
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Liberalization of access to the national capital markets of industrial.;..
ized countries and politically acceptable guarantee schemes are unlikely to
be of ;nuch help to the poorest LDCs, particularly those with import bills
heavily loaded with food and oil.

For those countries concessional finance,

of old and new types, seems necessary to achieve even modest per capita growth.
Imaginative new types of concessional flows, including schemes to facilitate
repayments in the form of new exports, as in recent agreements between Iran
and India, could ease both adjustment costs and political frictions.
To summarize:

possibilities appear to exist for tactical alliances

between at least some capital-importing LDCs and some financial institutions
from industrialized countries.

While the LDCs wish to expand their options

in international finance, the DC institutions desire to remain free from
severe controls (as in the Eurocurrency market)

or wish to be unshackled

from anachronistic regulations• benefitting mainly specialized lawyers and
bureaucrats in regulatory- agencies.

The desirability of a more flexible

and expanded world capital market has been reinforced by the expected accu~
mulation of financial assets by some oil-exporting LDCs, having their own
reasons to cement links with DC financial institutions. Both types of LDCs
have a clear and direct interest in the evolution of the rapidly changing
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system of international financial intermediation.

For example• how the recent

lifting of some United States restrictions on its national capital market
will affect the evolution of the Eurocurrency market• and the quantity and
qua.l.ity of financial assets and liabilities available to LDCs are matters of
concern to many such countries.

In particular, concentration trends among

Eurobanks (reported during 1974) and Joint moves by OECD countries to "ra
tionalize!' Eurocurrency lending and control world capital markets could threat
en the relatively open and competitive nature which those markets had during
1970-1974~

In the ongoing discussions on international monetary and financial

reform, these are matters the LDCs would do well to emphasize and monitor.

The LDCs and the New SDRs
By December

31, 1973 • the LDCs had used about one third of the SDRs

allocated to them, a smaller proportional net use than that of the United
Kingdom, but higher than for most industrialized countries.

In absolute

amounts, however, the net use of SDRs by the United States and the Unided
Kingdom, as of the indicated date• was larger than that of all LDCs put

24

together.

.

As it can be expected that LDCs will remain net users of SDRs one

may wonder whether the "hardening" of SDRs agreed upon in June 1974 by the
Committee of 20 will benefit those countries.
The LDCs have supported the thesis that the SDR should become the basis
of a reformed.monetary system, in which gold and reserve currencies would
pl9v" a declining role.

As emphasized by Gerald K. Helleiner • even without a

link the LDCs benefit substantially frcm SDRs relative to alternative realistic
manners of expanding international liquidity.

The new SDR definition as a
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large basket of currencies and its higher interest rate serve to further the
goal of making SDRs the principal reserve asset and the numeraire in the
international system.

Note that the new SDR provides an attractive asset to

hold 1 particularly for those LDCs wishing to avoid complications in their
reserve management.

It could also provide a natural 1mit of account for

international arrangements, such as commodity agreements, in which LDCs are
interested.

Such practice would meet one of the arguments used against the

generalized floating of key currencies.
The "grant element" in the net use of SDRs is of course reduced by a
higher interest rate.

But while for Brazil or Nigeria the credit-line

conditions implicit in the net use of new SDRs mey not b e ~ different
from those available to them in private markets, they still represent a
bargain for less fort1mate LDCs whose access to international liquidity
involves heavier costs.

To this extent the SDRs carry their own built-in

but modest progre£ si vity.
Another price mey eventually have to be paid by LDCs for the consolidation
and expansion of an SDR system.

Over the long run, collective control over

international reserves will require rules limiting holdings of currencies.
The LDCs, as well as other countries, are reluctant to accept international
rules limiting their freedcm regarding reserve composition.

With the old SDR

there was a large gap between returns in that instrument and those available
in the Eurocurrency market; this gap has now been narrowed.
issue remains.

Nevertheless the

It illustrates the broader question as to whether or not LDCs

should seek exemptions from general rules governing the international monetary
system.

It appears that those LDCs most interested in retaining flexibility
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over reserve composition are also those least likely to benefit from an SDR
standard, i.e., relatively fortunate countries with considerable access to
Eurocurrency and other capital markets.

It is precisely because of these

contacts and financial sophistication, and the close link between reserve and
debt management, that such semi-industrial ized countries oppose both limi
tations on reserve composition freedom, and the application to them of objec
tive indicators based on reserve levels for policy changes.

It may be added

that these are also countries whose public support for the link is not always
backed up by private comments of some of their financial officials.
Besides reducing the grant element of net SDR use, the "heavy" SDR
presents some technical complications in link schemes, which, however, could
be handled if there is the political will to go ahead with such proposals.
There is little to add to John Williamson's brilliant review of the mostly
secondary and unpersuasive arguments for and against the link.

The simple

and fundamental argument in this debate is well stated by Williamson:
"The international community has few instruments to improve
the world distribution of income, and therefore it should utilise
such opportunities as arise. One of these is the seigniorage
resulting from the production of fiduciary reserve assets. There
is a long and unfortunate tradition in economics of dismissing
this type of argument just because it involves a value judgment
additional to that embodied in the Pareto criterion. The degree
of egalitarianism needed to justify preference for the link
rather than neutrality is ~imal, given the existing facts on
world income distribution.'
In view of the difficulties being experienced by the least developed
countries, the case for distributing the linked share of SDRs according to a
formula taking into account per capita income as well as population, so it
contains an explicit and substantial. progressivity, appears particularly
strong.

And allocating such SDRs directly to the countries concerned conti-
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nues to be the best wey to promote responsible local leadership; the
institutions most in need of build-up are in the LDCs, not elsewhere.
If most or all of the new SDRs go in their first round to developing
countries, particularly to the poorest ones , who will pey interest to those
countries becoming net receivers?

Is it credible to expect the poorest LDCs

to continue to pey interest on their net use of SDRs, particularly once the
value to LDCs of new issues falls below interest peyments?

Because of these

queries, as well as to enhance the grant element of linked SDRs, an ex-ante
scheme to cleanly subsidize LDC interest p~nts appears desirable, and less
complicated than issuing different types of SDRs. 26
Whatever the fate of the link, the case for increasing the LDC share in
IMF quotas has been strengthened by the generalized floating of key currencies,
as discussed earlier in this essey, so that allocation to LDCs of SDRs "to
hold" should be correspondingly increased.
Increases in the private market price of gold have raised hopes for an
"instant link".

One scheme would involve a sharp rise in the official. gold

price, with a share of resulting paper or realized profits on the gold stocks
of industrialized co\.ttltries going to the LDCs.

Such a return to a gold

exchange standard, of course, would mean a weakening or disappearance of SDRs,
so the LDCs would be trading immediate gain for a steadier, longer r\.ttl ad
vantage.

Their hard-won new positions of influence within the IMF would become

less meaningful, as that institution would also be weakened by a re-monetiza
tion of basically South African gold.

This siren song of instant profit, one

hopes, should not lure LDCs to support such retrogressive scheme.

Richard N.

Cooper has put forth another proposal., much more attractive to LDCs, which

implies the demonetization of gold by gradual sales to private markets of
the gold hoards of the IMF and Central Banks.

Profits from such transac

tions, at least those realized by the IMF, would go to help (via one mechanism
or another) primarily the least developed countries.

Using resources provided

by wealthy individuals, who for whatever reason are willing to pay extravagant
sums for a yellow metal, to feed starving children is a bargain the world
should not pass up.

A Final Word
While short- and long-tenn pessimism about the non-socialist part of
the world economy has been rampant during 1974, the most plausible forecasts
still call for an eventual resumption of growth in major industrialized
countries and a continuation

(at a slower pace)

of expansionary

trends in international trade and finance observed since World War II.
Changes in world economic circumstances, particularly those involving increases
in the relative prices of food, fuel and other primary goods, will affect LDCs
in sharply different w~s; a possible decline in the growth of industrialized
countries will also have a variety of repercussions in different LDCs.

The

pull of forces originating in the world econoIJ\Y on LDCs will remain potent,
presenting opportunities as well as problems.

During recent years the oppor

tunities have been reflected in export performance and sources of finance
which only fifteen years ago would have seemed out of reach.

For many LDCs

even a less prosperous but still multipolar world econorcy, tensions and all,
will continue providing a non-trivial amount of room for some (but not all)
kinds of political and economic flexibility. The fundamental assumption here

is that the industrialized countries will not let the essentially transitory
and manageable problems faced by the world economy during 1974 degenerate
into a serious depression accompanied by a backsliding into protectionism
in trade and finance.

But if the worst comes• middle-income countries could

react by stimulating import-substitution within LDC common markets.
Even under optimistic assumptions regarding growth in the industrialized
world, the least developed LDCs, it bears repeating, face problems more fun
damental and less subtle than, say, coordinating monetary with exchange rate
policy.

Those problems are likely to require either dramatic domestic

refonns in the indicated countries, or increased concessional capital flows
from the rest of the world, or both.

This group of countries, located mainly

in South Asia and Central and East Africa, has been growing at lower per
capita growth rates than other LDCs for many years.

During 1972-74 natural

calamities, an inflation-induced decline in the real value of aid disburse
ments, and price increases in their imports of food, fuels and fertilizers
have sharply worsened the outlook for the almost billion persons in those
countries.
For the more fortunate and market-oriented LDCs the expansion end
integration of world commodity and money markets has raised the price of
domestic policy mistakes and has reduced some kinds of policy flexibility.

'

Experimentation with controls and other policies which buck pressures ema
nating from world markets requires more sophistication than, s~, during the
1950s.

Undoubtedly, LDCs planning offices and policy-ma.king machineey im

proved at a drama.tic pa.ct during the 1960s.

Every ounce of such gains, and

more, will be needed during the 1970s to take advantage of world market condi-
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tions without sacrificing domestic goals.
problem:

One example should illustrate the

with increasingly mobile capital and skilled labor, it will be more

difficult for an LDC with extensive links with advanced market economies to
influence its income distribution by manipulating by itself the rates of

· 27

return of those factors~

The international financial system which will eventually evolve out of
the troubled post-1971 circumstances will remain a source of concern to all
types of LDCs, even though one must admit that a good share of the time
devoted. by LDC Finance Ministers and their staff to attenting international
monetary conferences since 1971 m~ have been more productively devoted to
tackling domestic economic problems in those countries.

Be that as it m~,

substantial LDC participation in decision-making about international monetary
issues is an accomplishment unlikely to be reversed, particularly in view of
the importance of OPEC.
The fashionable disappointment sported by some observers in industrial
ized countries regarding allegedly "selfish" LDC behavior during interna
tional. monetary reform debates seems to be simply one more sympton of the
difficulty everyone has adjusting to more complex realities.

LDCs lacking

many weapons in international power games and with dismal poverty at home

should not be asked to set an example of statesmanship and generosity in in
ternational forums hardly characterized by such virtues.
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Footnotes

*Helpful

comments from Benjamin I. Cohen, Richard N. Cooper, Gerald K.

Helleiner, Harry G.

Johnson, Peter B. Kenen, Charles P. Kindleberger, Edwin

M. Truman, Delbert Snider, Ernest Stern and John Willamson are grate:f'ully acknowl
edged.

Participants at the Uppsala seminar in August 1974 also provided useful

advice.
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-50-

23

See, for example, Channa Weinberg, '·'Sanbar Proposal; Plan for

Increasing Trade Between Developing Countries," in Kidma, No. 2, 1973, pp. 3-6.

24

See Dhruba Gupta, "The first Four Years of SDRs," in Finance and

Development, Volume 11, No. 2, June 1974, p. 9, Table 4.

25

John Williamson, "International Liquidity:

Journal, Vol. 83, No. 331, September 1973, p. 728.

A Survey," The Economic
See also my comment in

International Monetary Fund, International Reserves; Needs and Availability,
Washington, D.C., 1970, pp. 34-35.

26

John Williamson first raised the concern that a competitive interest

rate would increase the danger that recipients of linked SDRs would default
on interest payments.

He proposed paying directly out of new SDRs link

allocations the interest due to net accumulators of previously issued SDRs.
See his "SDRs, Interest, and the Aid Link," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
Quarterly Review, June 1972, pp. 199-205.

See also Peter Isard and Edwin

M. Truman, "SDRs, Interest and the Aid Link:

Further Analysis," Banca Nazionale

del Lavoro Quarterly Review, March 1974, pp. 3-8.

Isard and Truman con-

vincingly argue that interest payments by LDCs on their use of SDRs allocated
under an aid link could be subsidized to increase the development assistance
content of the link without impairing the relative attractiveness of the
SDR as a reserve asset, a point also stressed by Gerald K. Helleiner, ££.· cit.
2 7TI ·
.
.
1is re fl ects, o f course, t h e genera 1 pro bl em o f growing
wor ld
· interdependence, emphasized by Richard N. Cooper, most recently in his Economic

Mobility and National. Economic Policy, Wicksell Lectures 1973 (Stockholm:
Almqviet and Wiksell International., 1974).

